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MARX AND RELIGION 
Gilbert Achcar 
[Chapter written for Marcello Musto, ed., The Marx Revival, Cambridge University 
Press, forthcoming] 
I. MARX’S ENGAGEMENT WITH RELIGION
Religion is one of the issues on which the Marxian corpus – the writings authored or 
coauthored by Karl Marx himself – is deficient. Although there are plenty of references to 
religion in Marx’s oeuvre, his most quoted statements on the topic belong to the initial 
transitional phase in his intellectual trajectory during which his break with the Young 
Hegelians unfolded. 
Thus, there is no Marxian theory of religion – a theoretical lacuna that contributed to the fact 
that, to this day, there is no reference work or body of work that can be regarded as providing 
a comprehensive Marxist theory of religion.1 The major reason for that, of course, is the high 
complexity of religion compared to plainly political ideologies. The theoretical tools 
developed by Marx cannot account alone for the multidimensional aspect of the question. 
Historical materialism is a necessary but insufficient explanans of religion, a topic that 
requires the input of all major human sciences such as anthropology, sociology or 
psychoanalysis. Moreover, Marx wrote quite less than Friedrich Engels about religion, 
probably because of a more limited interest in the topic determined by the limits of his 
personal religious experience compared to his friend’s. 
Yet, there are, of course, numerous analytical comments on religious matters in Marx’s 
writings beyond the famous statements of his youth. They can be classified under two 
categories: on the one hand, elements of a materialist interpretation of religion – scattered 
theoretical insights more than a full-fledged theory; on the other hand, religious metaphors 
1 In her Le Statut de la Religion chez Marx et Engels (Paris: Editions sociales, 1979), pp. 76-77, Michèle 
Bertrand rightly asserts that ‘Marx’s and Engels’s analysis of religion does not take the form of a full-fledged 
and complete theory of religion in general.’ A Marxist herself, she found in Marxism no valid answer to the 
question of ‘the permanence of religion’ (p. 184). For a wide-angle overview of Western Marxist and para-
Marxist engagements with religion, see R. Boer’s five-volume On Marxism and Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2007-
2014). 
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and analogies – the most famous is that of ‘fetishism’,2 but there are several others – with 
which Marx’s economic writings are ridden and which are of little use for a study of religion 
per se.3  
Besides, Marx’s writings include several political statements that constitute a coherent 
Marxian political attitude towards religion. Much less attention has been paid to this 
dimension of Marx’s thinking, largely subsumed under the Bolsheviks’ political stances on 
religion.4 
II. MARX’ LEFT-HEGELIAN CRITIQUE OF RELIGION 
The young Marx set most clearly the Left-Hegelian atheistic and anti-religious tenor of his 
doctoral dissertation (1840-41) in its foreword, where after quoting ‘the cry of Epicurus’ – 
‘Not the man who denies the gods worshipped by the multitude, but he who affirms of the 
gods what the multitude believes about them, is truly impious.’ – he presented the ‘confession 
of Prometheus’ – ‘I hate the pack of gods’ – as philosophy’s ‘own aphorism against all 
heavenly and earthly gods who do not acknowledge human self-consciousness as the highest 
divinity’.5 
However, it is only after finishing his dissertation – judging from the notebooks he wrote 
during his 1842 sojourn in Bonn6 – that Marx read some major works on religion, taking 
                                                 
2 With commodities,  
 
it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation 
between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped 
regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent 
beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race. So it is 
in the world of commodities with the products of men’s hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches 
itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities...  
(K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Book I, in MECW, vol. 35, p. 83.) 
 
3 See F. Bellue, ‘Typologie des métaphores religieuses dans Le Capital de K. Marx’, in G. Labica and J. Robelin 
(eds.), Politique et Religion, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1994), pp. 61-91. This study will not deal with the religious 
metaphors used by Marx, but only retrace the development of his historical materialist perspective on religion 
itself. 
4 Two recent works on the Bolsheviks and religion are P. Gabel, And God Created Lenin: Marxism vs. Religion 
in Russia, 1917-1929 (New York: Prometheus Books, 2005) and R. Boer, Lenin, Religion and Theology (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
5 K. Marx, Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, ‘Foreword’, in MECW, 
vol. 1, p. 30. Marx ended his dissertation likewise with a pugnaciously antireligious quote of Lucretius praising 
Epicurus, whom the young doctorand described as ‘the greatest representative of Greek Enlightenment’ (Ibid., 
p. 73). 
6 The Bonner Hefte are published in the MEGA2, IV/1. 
extensive notes. Two works had an outstanding impact on him: Charles de Brosses’s On the 
Worship of Fetish Gods (Du Culte des Dieux Fétiches, 1760), which Marx read in German 
translation, and Benjamin Constant’s De la Religion (1824-1831). 
From de Brosses, Marx borrowed the notion of fetishism (also discussed in Constant’s work, 
albeit in different terms).7 His earliest use of this notion – a recurrent theme in his writings 
thereafter – appeared in a July 1842 article in the Rheinische Zeitung,8 which is Marx’s first 
extensive public comment on religion. It includes his first materialist inversion of the idealist 
interpretation of the role of religion in history: ‘It was not the downfall of the old religions 
that caused the downfall of the ancient states, but the downfall of the ancient states that 
caused the downfall of the old religions.’9 A few months later, in a letter to Arnold Ruge, 
Marx displayed a rather simplistic conception of religion along with the conviction that it will 
eventually fade away: ‘religion in itself is without content, it owes its being not to heaven but 
to the earth, and with the abolition of distorted reality, of which it is the theory, it will 
collapse of itself.’10 
The materialist inversion lies at the heart of Marx’s 1843 essays criticizing two writings by 
the Young Hegelian Bruno Bauer on the ‘Jewish question’. In that twofold rebuttal entitled 
‘On the Jewish Question’, Marx had not completely broken yet with an essentialist appraisal 
of religion – Judaism and Christianity in that case – in the vein of Feuerbach’s half-baked 
assessment of the Christian religion, characteristically titled The Essence of Christianity.11 
Thus, Marx was still discussing the ‘essence’ of each of Judaism and Christianity in 
idealisations called ‘the Jew’ and ‘the Christian’. He saw the essence of ‘the Jew’ and 
‘Judaism’ as defined by monetary relations and contended that this essence is the result not of 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of Marx’s borrowing from de Brosses, see R. Boer, Criticism of Earth: On Marxism and 
Theology IV (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 177-206, and In the Vale of Tears: On Marxism and Theology V (Leiden: 
Brill, 2014), pp. 289-309. For a comparison between Constant’s and Marx’s notion of fetishism, see B. Garsten, 
‘Religion and the Case Against Ancient Liberty: Benjamin Constant’s Other Lectures’, Political Theory, 38:1 
(2010), pp. 4-33. 
8 K. Marx, ‘The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung’, in MECW, vol. 1, p. 189. 
9 Ibid. 
10 K. Marx, ‘Letter to Arnold Ruge’, November 30, 1842, in MECW, vol. 1, p. 395. 
11 See L. Althusser’s critical discussion of Feuerbach and his influence on the early Marx in his For Marx, trans. 
B. Brewster, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1969. 
the Jewish religion per se, but of the Jews’ actual historical insertion ‘in the interstices’ of 
medieval European societies, as he put it in his economic manuscripts of later years.12 
Let us not look for the secret of the Jew in his religion, but let us look for the secret of 
his religion in the real Jew. ... 
The Jew has emancipated himself in a Jewish manner, not only because he has 
acquired financial power, but also because, through him and also apart from him, 
money has become a world power and the practical Jewish spirit has become the 
practical spirit of the Christian nations. The Jews have emancipated themselves 
insofar as the Christians have become Jews. ...  
Judaism continues to exist not in spite of history, but owing to history. ... The god of 
the Jews has become secularized and has become the god of the world.13  
 
It is in the wake of these essays that Marx wrote the much-quoted and very lyrical 
‘Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction’, published in 1844 
in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. 
The basis of irreligious criticism is: The human being makes religion; religion does 
not make the human being. Religion is the self-consciousness and self-esteem of the 
human who has either not yet found himself or has already lost himself again. But the 
human is no abstract being encamped outside the world. The human is the world of 
the human — state, society. This state, this society, produce religion, an inverted 
world-consciousness, because they are an inverted world. Religion is the general 
theory of that world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in a popular form, its 
spiritualistic point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn 
complement, its universal source of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic 
realisation of the human essence because the human essence has no true reality. The 
struggle against religion is therefore indirectly a fight against the world of which 
religion is the spiritual aroma.14 
                                                 
12 Here are three statements from Marx’s Grundrisse (K. Marx, Economic Manuscripts 1857-1861, MECW, 
vols. 28 and 29) on the economic role of Jews in history: ‘Special trading peoples could play this mediating role 
between peoples whose mode of production did not yet presuppose exchange value as its basis. Thus in 
antiquity, and later the Lombards, thus the Jews within the old Polish society or in medieval society in general.’ 
(vol. 28, p. 184.) ‘Wealth as an end-in-itself appears only among a few trading peoples – monopolists of the 
carrying trade – who live in the pores of the ancient world like the Jews in medieval society.’ (vol. 28, p. 411.) 
‘[T]he Semites in the interstices of the ancient world, and the Jews, Lombards and Normans in the interstices of 
the medieval society, alternately represent … the different moments of circulation – money and commodity. 
They are the mediators of the social exchange of matter.’ (vol. 29, p. 481.) On Marxist discussions of ‘the 
Jewish question’ from Marx to Abram Leon, see E. Traverso, The Marxists and the Jewish Question: The 
History of a Debate (1843–1943), trans. B. Gibbons (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993). 
13 K. Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’, in MECW, vol. 3, pp. 169-72. Here and in all subsequent quotes, 
emphasis is in the original. 
14 K. Marx, ‘Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction’, in MECW, vol. 3, p. 175. 
Here and in further quotations, ‘man’ has been replaced with ‘human’ in translating the German Mensch after 
verification of the original in the Marx Engels Werke. 
 
Restating in the passage above a central idea of Ludwig Feuerbach’s critique of religion 
(‘The human being makes religion’), Marx went one step further in his materialist critique. 
The statement that ‘the human is no abstract being’ is a direct rebuff to Feuerbach. Like the 
latter, however, and with Christianity mainly in mind, the young Marx fully acknowledged 
the spiritual role played by religion, alongside its essence as a vulgar ‘false consciousness’. 
He formulated this insight in admirable terms: 
Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and also the 
protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of 
a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the 
people.  
To sublate religion as the illusory happiness of the people is to demand their real 
happiness. The demand to give up illusions about the existing state of affairs is the 
demand to give up a state of affairs which needs illusions. The criticism of religion is 
therefore in embryo the criticism of the vale of tears, the halo of which is religion.15 
 
To describe religion as both a sublimated ‘expression’ of ‘real distress’ and a ‘protest’ against 
it was a very perceptive statement, but Marx did unfortunately not pursue the ‘protest’ 
dimension. He did not give thought to the fact that Christianity – as Engels would later 
acknowledge in his 1850 The Peasant War in Germany, albeit in a limited way16 – had 
proved ‘its ability to shoulder the aspirations of the oppressed and the poor’ in the words of 
Michèle Bertrand.17 Hence Marx’s unqualified diatribe in 1847 against ‘the social principles 
of Christianity’ which he presented as completely antithetic with communism.18 
The opium metaphor is widely regarded as epitomizing Marx’s view of religion. It became 
one of his most quoted phrases, although he was merely resorting to an analogy used by 
several authors before him, from Immanuel Kant to Heinrich Heine, to illustrate a view that is 
‘not at all specifically Marxist’ as Michael Löwy emphasized.19 Marx’s description of the 
                                                 
15 K. Marx, ‘Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction’, in MECW, vol. 3, p. 175-
6. Here and in one more quotation, ‘abolition’ has been replaced with ‘sublation’ in translating the German 
Aufhebung after verification of the original in the Marx Engels Werke. 
16 F. Engels, The Peasant War in Germany, in MECW, vol. 10. For a critique of Engels’s views, see G. Achcar, 
‘Religion and Politics Today from a Marxian Perspective’, in Achcar, Marxism, Orientalism, Cosmopolitanism 
(London: Saqi and Chicago: Haymarket, 2013), pp. 10-39. 
17 Bertrand, Le Statut de la Religion, p. 34. 
18 K. Marx, ‘The Communism of the Rheinischer Beobachter’, in MECW, vol. 6, p. 231. 
19 M. Löwy, The War of Gods: Religion and Politics in Latin America (London: Verso, 1996), p. 5. 
consoling virtue of religion was also in tune with the first chapter of Constant’s De la 
Religion.20 
In the context of the battle waged by 20th century’s Communism against religion, this famous 
statement came to be interpreted as more pejorative than intended. This was also related to a 
negative shift in the perception of opium compared to the 19th century when it was still 
commonly used medically as sedative and tranquillizer.21 Yet, the pendulum of historical 
interpretations shifted again in recent years towards overemphasis on the seemingly positive 
connotation of Marx’s description of religion as ‘the sigh of the oppressed’, seen as denoting 
empathy. 
The young Marx, however, was only stating the obvious: religion acts as a tranquillizer 
against the deep anxiety provoked by the modern world. It provides an ‘illusory happiness’ 
that, he believed, could be superseded by the realization of ‘real happiness’, which would 
make illusions superfluous. The criticism of religion should therefore lead to the criticism of 
the down-to-earth world. 
The immediate task of philosophy, which is at the service of history, once the holy 
form of human self-estrangement has been unmasked, is to unmask self-estrangement 
in its unholy forms. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of the earth, 
the criticism of religion into the criticism of law and the criticism of theology into the 
criticism of politics.22 
 
Marx went on for a while pursuing the philosophic task of unmasking ‘unholy’ alienation as a 
necessary complement to his former comrades’ unmasking of religious alienation. In this 
endeavour, he made an analogy between both types of alienation, thus providing a clue to the 
later mutation of his philosophical critique into a political-economic critique of capitalism 
and highlighting the methodological continuity between them. 
[T]he more the worker spends himself, the more powerful becomes the alien world of 
objects which he creates over and against himself, the poorer he himself – his inner 
                                                 
20 B. Constant, De la Religion (Arles: Actes Sud), 1999, ‘Du sentiment religieux’, pp. 39-52. 
21 See A. McKinnon, ‘Reading “Opium of the People”: Expression, Protest and the Dialectics of Religion’, 
Critical Sociology, 31:1-2 (2005), pp. 15-38. 
22 K. Marx, ‘Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction’, in MECW, vol. 3, p. 176. 
In the German original, Selbstentfremdung, here translated as ‘self-estrangement’, refers to the concept of 
alienation, Entfremdung. 
world – becomes, the less belongs to him as his own. It is the same in religion. The 
more humans put into God, the less they retain in themselves. …  
Religious estrangement as such occurs only in the realm of consciousness, of the 
human’s inner life, but economic estrangement is that of real life; its transcendence 
therefore embraces both aspects.23 
 
This led Marx to supersede the atheistic critique of religion as a foregone moment. He no 
longer felt the need to engage in it, thus distancing himself from his former Young Hegelian 
comrades. 
[A]theism is a negation of God, and postulates the existence of the human being 
through this negation; but socialism as socialism no longer stands in any need of such 
a mediation. It proceeds from the theoretically and practically sensuous 
consciousness of the human being and of nature as the essence. Socialism is man’s 
positive self-consciousness, no longer mediated through the sublation of religion...24 
 
In The Holy Family, the first work that Marx cowrote with Engels, Bruno Bauer is attacked 
for keeping the debate on the terrain of religion. The book constitutes a useful complement to 
Marx’s essays ‘On the Jewish Question’ in that it clarifies the latter’s arguments and sheds a 
useful light on the issue of its alleged antisemitism. Bauer shared Hegel’s brand of anti-
Judaism combined with no hostility to the Jews as citizens, and Hegel’s view of Christianity 
as the absolute religion. He dealt with the ‘Jewish question’ in such religious-philosophical 
terms, while Marx and Engels strived to bring the issue down to the earth of material 
determinants. 
… Herr Bauer has no inkling that real secular Jewry, and hence religious Jewry too, 
is being continually produced by the present-day civil life and finds its final 
development in the money system. … For Herr Bauer, as a theologian of the Christian 
faith, the world-historic significance of Jewry had to cease the moment Christianity 
was born. Hence he had to repeat the old orthodox view that it has maintained itself in 
spite of history…25 
 
                                                 
23 K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in MECW, vol. 3, pp. 272, 297. 
24 Ibid., p. 306. Compare to Engels’s much later assertion about ‘German Social Democratic workers’ that 
‘atheism has already outlived its usefulness for them; this pure negation does not apply to them, since they no 
longer stand in theoretical, but only in practical opposition to all belief in God: they are simply through with 
God, they live and think in the real world and are, therefore, materialists.’ (F. Engels, ‘Programme of the 
Blanquist Commune Refugees’, in MECW, vol. 24, pp. 15-16.) 
25 K. Marx and F. Engels, The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Criticism: Against Bruno Bauer and 
Company, in MECW, vol. 4, p. 109. 
The Holy Family reinstated in clearer form the key theses of Marx’s essays. Rather than 
targeting the Jews singled out by Bauer’s ‘theological’ approach, which it characterized as 
‘theological fanaticism’, the book asserted that the material basis of the Jews’ historical 
specificity within Christian society, i.e. their function as agents of the monetary economy, has 
become universal. 
The existence of the present-day Jew was not explained by his religion – as though 
this religion were something apart, independently existing – but the tenacious survival 
of the Jewish religion was explained by practical features of civil society which are 
fantastically reflected in that religion. The emancipation of the Jews into human 
beings, or the human emancipation of Jewry, was therefore not conceived, as by Herr 
Bauer, as the special task of the Jews, but as a general practical task of the present-day 
world, which is Jewish to the core. It was proved that the task of abolishing the 
essence of Jewry is actually the task of abolishing the Jewish character of civil 
society, abolishing the inhumanity of the present-day practice of life, the most 
extreme expression of which is the money system.26  
 
Marx distanced himself further from the Young Hegelians as his political radicalization 
progressed. His 1845 ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, with their conclusion on revolutionary praxis – 
‘revolutionary, practical-critical, activity’ – represented a new step towards overcoming the 
essentialism inherent in Feuerbach’s ‘contemplative materialism’: 
Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-estrangement, of the duplication of 
the world into a religious world and a secular one. His work consists in resolving the 
religious world into its secular basis. But that the secular basis lifts off from itself and 
establishes itself as an independent realm in the clouds can only be explained by the 
inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must, 
therefore, itself be both understood in its contradiction and revolutionised in 
practice.27 
 
III. TOWARDS A MATERIALIST INTERPRETATION OF RELIGION 
Marx and Engels completed their break with the Young Hegelians and expounded main 
tenets of their new materialist conception of history in The German Ideology, which they 
drafted in 1845-46 and ended renouncing to publish. The issue of religion was still central to 
that final engagement with their former companions: 
The Young Hegelians criticised everything by ascribing religious conceptions to it or 
by declaring that it is a theological matter. The Young Hegelians are in agreement 
                                                 
26 Ibid., p. 109-10. 
27 K. Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, in MECW, vol. 5, p. 4. 
with the Old Hegelians in their belief in the rule of religion, of concepts, of a 
universal principle in the existing world. Except that the one party attacks this rule as 
usurpation, while the other extols it as legitimate.28 
 
This time, however, the two co-thinkers went beyond their philosophical ‘critique of critical 
criticism’, as they had called it ironically, into laying out the foundations of their new 
conception of history with a radical inversion of perspective leading to the elaboration of 
historical materialism. 
The phantoms formed in the brains of the humans are …, necessarily, sublimates of 
their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material 
premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, and all the rest of ideology as well as the 
forms of consciousness corresponding to these, thus no longer retain the semblance of 
independence.29 
 
The materialist conception of history was thus born along with its dialectical dimension: 
This conception of history thus relies on expounding the real process of production – 
starting from the material production of life itself – and comprehending the form of 
intercourse connected with and created by this mode of production, i.e., civil society 
in its various stages, as the basis of all history; describing it in its action as the state, 
and also explaining how all the different theoretical products and forms of 
consciousness, religion, philosophy, morality, etc., etc., arise from it, and tracing the 
process of their formation from that basis; thus the whole thing can, of course, be 
depicted in its totality (and therefore, too, the reciprocal action of these various sides 
on one another).30 
 
The manuscript included an interesting insight on religion – ‘Religion is from the outset 
consciousness of the transcendental arising from actually existing forces.’ – which the 
authors did unfortunately not develop ‘more popularly’ as they intended to do.31 What they 
provided about the materialist explanation of religion were essentially leads into a research 
programme. 
[D]efinite relations of industry and intercourse are necessarily connected with a 
definite form of society, hence, with a definite form of state and hence with a definite 
form of religious consciousness. If [Max] Stirner had looked at the real history of the 
                                                 
28 K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, in MECW, vol. 5, p. 30. 
29 Ibid., pp. 36-7. 
30 Ibid., p. 53. 
31 Ibid., p. 93. 
Middle Ages, he could have found why the Christian’s notion of the world took 
precisely this form in the Middle Ages, and how it happened that it subsequently 
passed into a different one; he could have found that ‘Christianity’ has no history 
whatever and that all the different forms in which it was visualised at various times 
were not ‘self-determinations’ and ‘further developments’ ‘of the religious spirit’, but 
were brought about by wholly empirical causes in no way dependent on any influence 
of the religious spirit.32 
 
In their Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Engels further discussed the view of the 
intimate connection of religion, as a form of consciousness, and the material conditions of 
society. They formulated a heuristic, albeit rather crude, explanation of the historical 
persistence of religions and other ideological forms, attributing it to the permanence of class 
division: 
‘Undoubtedly,’ it will be said, ‘religious, moral, philosophical and juridical ideas have 
been modified in the course of historical development. But religion, morality, 
philosophy, political science, and law, constantly survived this change. …’ 
… The history of all past society has consisted in the development of class 
antagonisms, antagonisms that assumed different forms at different epochs.  
But whatever form they may have taken, one fact is common to all past ages, viz., the 
exploitation of one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social 
consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves 
within certain common forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish 
except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms.33 
 
The dialectics of religious permanence and change – the transmutation of religions along with 
the historical change of material conditions while retaining some forms, which is the key to 
religions’ historical persistence – is a theme that is recurrent in the two co-thinkers’ 
comments on Christianity in particular. Thus, in the sharp critique of Georg Friedrich 
Daumer’s Die Religion des neuen Weltalters that they published in 1850, they stressed ‘that 
after the Germanic invasion the “new world conditions” did not adapt themselves to 
Christianity but that Christianity itself changed with every new phase of these world 
conditions.’34 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p. 154. 
33 K. Marx and F. Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in MECW, vol. 6, p. 504. 
34 K. Marx and F. Engels, ‘Reviews from the Neue Rheinische Zeitung. Politisch-Ökonomische Revue No. 2’, 
in MECW, vol. 10, p. 244. 
In Marx’s later economic writings, Christianity is portrayed as the religion of capital par 
excellence. As he put it ironically in his 1861-63 economic manuscripts, capitalism is 
as truly cosmopolitan as Christianity. This is why Christianity is likewise the special 
religion of capital. In both it is only humans who count. One human in the abstract is 
worth just as much or as little as the next human. In the one case, all depends on 
whether or not the human has faith, in the other, on whether or not the human has 
credit. In addition, however, in the one case, predestination has to be added, and in the 
other case, the accident of whether or not a human is born with a silver spoon in 
mouth.35 
 
Marx expanded upon this idea in Capital in the famous section on ‘The Fetishism of 
Commodities’: 
The religious world is but the reflex of the real world. And for a society based upon 
the production of commodities, in which the producers in general enter into social 
relations with one another by treating their products as commodities and values, 
whereby they reduce their individual private labour to the standard of homogeneous 
human labour – for such a society, Christianity with its cultus of abstract man, more 
especially in its bourgeois developments, Protestantism, Deism, &c, is the most fitting 
form of religion.36  
 
A footnote in Capital also includes a brief methodological statement that Marx did alas not 
elaborate: 
Technology discloses the human’s mode of dealing with Nature, the process of 
production by which, the human sustains the human’s life, and thereby also lays bare 
the mode of formation of the human’s social relations, and of the mental conceptions 
that flow from them. Every history of religion, even, that fails to take account of this 
material basis, is uncritical. It is, in reality, much easier to discover by analysis the 
earthly core of the misty creations of religion, than, conversely, it is, to develop from 
the actual relations of life the corresponding celestialised forms of those relations. The 
latter method is the only materialistic, and therefore the only scientific one.37 
 
There are scattered insights informed by this perspective in Marx’s economic writings. They 
mostly deal with Protestantism as the version of Christianity that is correlative with 
                                                 
35 K. Marx, Economic Manuscript of 1861-63, in MECW, vol. 33, p. 369. 
36 K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Book I, in MECW, vol. 35, p. 90. 
37 K. Marx, Ibid., p. 375, note 2. 
capitalism, in the historical materialist vein that Max Weber famously discussed in his The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Here are two such comments: 
The cult of money has its corresponding asceticism, its renunciation, its self-sacrifice 
– thrift and frugality, contempt for the worldly, temporary and transient pleasures; the 
pursuit of eternal treasure. Hence the connection of English Puritanism or also Dutch 
Protestantism with money-making.38 
 
The monetary system is essentially a Catholic institution, the credit system essentially 
Protestant. ‘The Scotch hate gold.’ In the form of paper the monetary existence of 
commodities is only a social one. It is Faith that brings salvation. Faith in money 
value as the immanent spirit of commodities, faith in the mode of production and its 
predestined order, faith in the individual agents of production as mere personifications 
of self-expanding capital. But the credit system does not emancipate itself from the 
basis of the monetary system any more than Protestantism has emancipated itself from 
the foundations of Catholicism.39  
 
One aspect of the capitalist function of Protestantism is that it ‘was also a means for 
increasing surplus labour’:40 ‘Protestantism, by changing almost all the traditional holidays 
into workdays, plays an important part in the genesis of capital.’41 Marx also emphasized the 
correlation between Malthusianism and Protestantism: ‘It is characteristic that the economic 
fall of man, the Adam’s apple, the urgent appetite, … that this delicate question was and is 
monopolised by the Reverends of Protestant Theology, or rather of the Protestant Church.’42 
He mocked Protestantism’s lack of empathy for the poor: ‘If the Venetian monk found in the 
fatal destiny that makes misery eternal, the raison d’être of Christian charity …, the 
Protestant prebendary finds in it a pretext for condemning the laws in virtue of which the 
poor possessed a right to a miserable public relief.’43 This, Marx called ‘the “spirit” of 
Protestantism’.44 
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39 K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Book III, in MECW, vol. 37, p. 587. 
40 K. Marx, Economic Manuscript of 1861-63, in MECW, vol. 34, p. 300. 
41 K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Book I, in MECW, vol. 35, p. 281, note 2. 
42 Ibid., p. 612. 
43 Ibid., p. 641. 
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Much less, and much less interesting, comments on other religions are found among Marx’s 
writings.45 His most apposite observation in this regard is the not so ‘easily answerable’ 
question that he formulated about the Orient in a 1853 letter to Engels: ‘So far as religion is 
concerned, the question may be reduced to a general and hence easily answerable one: Why 
does the history of the East appear as a history of religions?’46 Marx’s emphasis on ‘appear’ 
here sounds as a clue to the fact that the problem lies primarily in the Western perception of 
the East, i.e. the problem of Orientalism in the sense popularized by Edward Said. It is highly 
unlikely though that this was Marx’s intent.47 
III. THE MARXIAN POLITICAL ATTITUDE ON RELIGION 
Marx’s political attitude toward religion took shape at the confluence of two influences: the 
anticlerical atheism that he inherited from his time with the Young Hegelians was tempered 
with the liberal-secular attitude that he found in Benjamin Constant, whose influence on 
Marx is generally underrated if mentioned at all.48 That the young Marx, in his 1842 article 
on censorship, should defend the freedom to criticize religion, Christianity included, is not 
surprising.49 He construed this freedom as part of the general freedom of opinion in the 
liberal-secular vein, as he did in his first long engagement with the topic of religion where he 
rejected any privilege to any dogma or creed.50 
Marx went on to develop a strong argument for a strict separation of religion and state, 
vigorously denouncing those who want to ‘make religion into a theory of constitutional 
law’:51 
The truly religious state is the theocratic state; the head of such states must be either 
the God of religion, Jehovah himself, as in the Jewish state, or God’s representative, 
the Dalai Lama, as in Tibet, or finally, … all the Christian states must subordinate 
themselves to a church which is an ‘infallible church’. For where, as under 
Protestantism, there is no supreme head of the church, the rule of religion is nothing 
but the religion of rule, the cult of the government’s will.  
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51 Ibid., p. 198. 
Once a state includes several creeds having equal rights, it can no longer be a 
religious state without being a violation of the rights of the particular creeds, a church 
which condemns all adherents of a different creed as heretics, which makes every 
morsel of bread depend on one’s faith, and which makes dogma the link between 
individuals and their existence as citizens of the state.52  
 
Yet, by the end of 1842, Marx, whose communist political views were maturing, was also 
clearly taking his distance from the fixation with religion of some of the Young Hegelians.53 
He reported to Arnold Ruge his reply to a query from Eduard Meyen, a prominent member of 
the Berlin circle of ‘The Free’: 
I replied at once and frankly expressed my opinion about the defects of their writings, 
which find freedom in a licentious, sans-culotte-like, and at the same time convenient, 
form, rather than in a free, i.e., independent and profound, content. … I requested 
further that religion should be criticised in the framework of criticism of political 
conditions rather than that political conditions should be criticised in the framework 
of religion… Finally, I desired that, if there is to be talk about philosophy, there 
should be less trifling with the label ‘atheism’ (which reminds one of children, 
assuring everyone who is ready to listen to them that they are not afraid of the bogy 
man), and that instead the content of philosophy should be brought to the people.54 
 
Constant’s impassionate defence of the freedom of religion, unrestricted individual religious 
freedom, as being the most effective guarantee against the power of any single religion, had 
left its mark on the young Marx.55 The clarification of his polemics with Bauer in The Holy 
Family confirmed this inspiration, including a repudiation of the ‘terroristic attitude’ that 
emerged during the French Revolution: 
Herr Bauer was shown that when the Jew demands freedom and nevertheless refuses 
to renounce his religion, he ‘is engaging in politics’ and sets no condition that is 
contrary to political freedom. Herr Bauer was shown that it is by no means contrary to 
political emancipation to divide the human into the non-religious citizen and the 
religious private individual. He was shown that just as the state emancipates itself 
from religion by emancipating itself from state religion and leaving religion to itself 
within civil society, so the individual emancipates himself politically from religion by 
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regarding it no longer as a public matter but as a private matter. Finally, it was shown 
that the terroristic attitude of the French Revolution to religion, far from refuting this 
conception, bears it out.56  
 
Thus, Marx and Engels emphasized that ‘the right to believe what one wishes, the right to 
practise any religion, is explicitly recognised as a universal human right’ and reminded Bauer 
that Jacques Hébert’s faction was defeated during the French Revolution under the accusation 
that ‘it attacked human rights by attacking freedom of religion’.57 Furthermore, in their The 
German Ideology, the two friends ridiculed Bruno Bauer with mordant irony for his pretence 
to have ‘smashed’ religion and the state.58 
Yet Marx and Engels kept advocating within the communist movement a relentless struggle 
to debunk bourgeois ideology under all its guises, religion included. ‘Law, morality, religion, 
are to [the proletarian] so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as 
many bourgeois interests.’59 However, Marx must have bitterly regretted the blunder he made 
in November 1847, in his report to the London German Workers’ Educational Society, when 
he praised Georg Friedrich Daumer’s book The Secrets of Christian Antiquity (Die 
Geheimnisse des christlichen Altertums, 1847). Daumer, the same author whom Marx and 
Engels harshly criticized three years later,60 had tried to give new currency to the ancient 
Roman legend according to which the persecuted early Christians practised anthropophagic 
rites. ‘This story’, explained Marx to his audience, ‘as presented in Daumer’s work, deals 
Christianity the last blow... It gives us the certainty that the old society is coming to an end 
and that the edifice of fraud and prejudice is collapsing.’61 
Marx’s and Engels’s attitude towards religion remained fundamentally dual: defence of 
unhindered individual freedom of belief against state interference, combined with 
emancipatory fight by the workers’ party against religious beliefs. It is this same position that 
Marx forcefully reiterated in his 1875 Critique of the Gotha Programme: 
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‘Freedom of conscience’! If one desired at this time of the Kulturkampf to remind 
liberalism of its old catchwords, it surely could have been done only in the following 
form: Everyone should be able to attend to his religious as well as his bodily needs 
without the police sticking their noses in. But the workers’ party ought at any rate in 
this connection to have expressed its awareness of the fact that bourgeois ‘freedom of 
conscience’ is nothing but the toleration of all possible kinds of religious unfreedom 
of conscience, and that for its part it endeavours rather to liberate the conscience from 
the witchery of religion.62 
 
And yet, Marx and Engels firmly and consistently upheld the liberal rejection of state 
coercion of religious belief and practice in the private sphere. This came out most clearly in 
their critique of other radical left currents advocating the suppression of religion. In 1868, 
Marx commented on the margin of the Bakuninist programme promising ‘abolition of cults, 
substitution of science for faith and human justice for divine justice’: ‘As if one could declare 
– by decree – the abolition of faith!’63 He reiterated this opinion in the interview he gave in 
1879 to the Chicago Tribune: ‘We know … that violent measures against religion are 
nonsense; but this is an opinion: as Socialism grows, religion will disappear. Its 
disappearance must be done by social development, in which education must play a great 
part.’64 
* * * 
Socialism, as envisaged by Marx, did not grow in the twentieth century; the regimes that 
claimed that label and invoked his name across the world did much disservice to both, and 
most have ended up crumbling miserably. Far from disappearing, religion witnessed a 
spectacular surge in the century’s final decades, most strikingly in fundamentalist versions. 
To understand this ‘revenge of God’, as one observer called it,65 Marx’s reflections on 
religion provide indispensable clues, along with other key inputs in social sciences such as 
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Emile Durkheim’s notion of anomie.66 The materialist conception of history leads us to 
explore the socioeconomic background upon which the ‘return of the religious’, as the 
phenomenon has been widely designated, did occur. Indeed, its concomitance with the 
massive degradation of social conditions that resulted from both the neoliberal turn in global 
capitalism and the terminal crisis of ‘really existing socialism’ followed by its collapse is 
certainly not a sheer coincidence. In this regard, even the young Marx’s Left-Hegelian 
conceptualization and formulation of the correspondence between socioeconomic alienation 
and religious alienation are useful. 
The ongoing religious surge lends renewed importance to the Marxian political attitude 
towards religion. The European heartlands of Enlightenment themselves are confronted anew 
with this problem, complicated in their case by the fact that the religion in question is Islam, 
the creed of downtrodden populations of migrant origin. Marx’s attitude towards religion 
should become again a source of inspiration to those who adhere to his general theory.67 
Religious freedom must be defended even more vigorously when it is curtailed out of racist 
hatred for the holders of a minority religion. Under such conditions, the defence of this 
freedom becomes a necessary component of the struggle against racism in addition to being a 
component of the fight for political freedom in general. 
However, as Marx reminded his German comrades, the defence of religious freedom of 
conscience must not eclipse the struggle against religious unfreedom of conscience as well as 
religious unfreedom to attend to one’s bodily needs, whether it is a matter of state-imposed 
unfreedom as is still the case in many countries or one of religious chains self-imposed in a 
desperate attempt to soothe the anxiety generated by the precariousness of social conditions 
in the neoliberal age. The struggle for the secular separation of religion and state, and in 
defence of this separation where it is accomplished, remains of immediate relevance in the 
21st century, as is the struggle against the broad range of uses of religion for reactionary 
political purposes. 
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